On Consciousness

Our method for perceiving objects is to look upon them from the outside of them, though granted we may perceive the innards of an object, but even then we are outside the innards looking upon them. However, for ourselves, we appear to be an object inside our bodies looking outwards at phenomena. This is not only the case for physical phenomena, but also for mental phenomena; for when we utilize the mechanics of imagination, we still appear to be an internal object looking upon some external phenomena (inside ourselves). Is it possible that the object which is looking outwards is consciousness? What consequences follow if this object, which is something within us looking outwards, is consciousness?

If consciousness can look upon itself, then our inquiry is, at least, partially answered. One object that is never too far away from consciousness is the body. It is clear that we can perceive our own bodies by use of a mirror, but I’m reluctant to claim that the consciousness is perceiving itself when it looks upon the object that it appears to be within. But, if our own bodies aren’t considered to be consciousness, then what else can we consider consciousness to be? For physical objects always give the body more of a feeling of reality than mental objects, whenever the two are compared. If our own body is not the consciousness, though it appears to be as consistent in existence as consciousness itself, then how can we make any mental objects consciousness; for no mental object is as consistent as the consciousness or body, though they may appear before the mind frequently. Even if we gave a mental object that has appeared before us the label of consciousness, we would still be obliged to explain the reason why we identify the mental object as consciousness.

Let us return to the basic description of consciousness, which is “awareness of one’s own existence.” If the consciousness is an object that looks upon other objects from the inside of some object, how is it aware of its own existence? For consciousness appears to be aware of many objects, but none of them can firmly be considered consciousness. And consciousness doesn’t seem to possess the ability to look upon itself, and if it has, how will we know? We become aware of the existence of other objects, physical or mental, by a perception of them. However, we claim such a thing as consciousness exist, without having any perception of such a phenomena; for we can not perceive consciousness physically nor mentally. This presents a major threat to any conception of reality that would attempt to describe existence accurately. For whether we claim all things are mental or physical, we must explain how we came to such knowledge. If we say we observed such and such phenomena, but never observed the object which is observing the phenomena, how can we claim to know the information we are receiving is true?

My personal fix to this dilemma is to be rid of the concept of consciousness completely. Consciousness appears to be a failed attempt at discovering a feature of the body and brain that is somehow beyond them both (like the spirit or soul). If we know the interactions between body and brain are the cause of our personal experiences, and that the brain is the physical structure that causes most of our bodily motions and all of our mental events, then I see no reason not to assume it is the brain and body that perceives phenomena and interacts with objects. This, however, would require some alteration to one’s model of reality, particularly a will caused solely by the brain. For we would no longer be able to claim we were in control of our bodies unless when we use the term “we” or “I”, we are referring to our brain.