The relationship between the object, other, and self changes when moving through philosophical domains. For ontology, all that exist is one object, there are no distinctions between the three. Some event brings us to the realization that we have been made other to the totality of existence. It is a calculation made by the brain. We discover the notion of otherness that was somewhere possible. One finds one’s self in the totality as a part. Epistemology perceives distinctions and one can only hope one’s brain is sufficient to understand epistemology.
One can perhaps conceive a self as an other to ontology when pondering on the parts of the ontology that one controls and the parts one does not control, this typically coming in the form of oppositions, e.g. pleasure/pain, gain/loss, positive/negative. Would the self perceive itself as an object apart from the world if it had no conflicts with it? The nihilism of ontology presents a major problem for an object that cares for itself. Ethics places a high value on the self and other selves. Though the hard problem of consciousness presents feelings as something redundant to machines, it appears to be a useful tool in distinguishing the difference between a self and an object. Words and intelligent acts could have the same effect, but considering the history of the collectives of decision-makers, they are likely to consider intelligent nonsentient beings to be of equal value to sophisticated rocks.
The relationship between self, other, and object generates a problem of economics. Individuals own and produce objects. These objects can be exchanged for other objects from others. Individuals desire to avoid losses, thus they will attempt to trade less for more or equal for equal. Any item with the exact same dimensions as another is considered a duplicate of it and can be considered equal. There is no reason in trading an equal with another because it doesn’t change one’s state. The option is to trade lesser for more, which can only be done through deceit from the lesser owner, or sacrifice from the greater owner. One can also trade an object of different dimensionality but equal value. One can give more of a lesser item to compensate for the lower value. If one item is a fraction off from another, pieces of the lesser item can be given if that doesn’t destroy the item's integrity.
Objects have different values depending on time, place, individual, and domain of value. These domains have a specific order of priority in ethics, so objects have a value based on a domain and the domains have particular weights depending on their place in the priority. Ethics appears to weigh the weights as ordered: Objective, functional, universal, collectivistic, individualistic, physical, personal, psychological, aesthetic, subjective.
Kantian politics and virtue psychology don’t appear to have a self as separate from the collective. In relativistic aesthetics and utilitarian mathematics, we see the self manifest itself as a shaper of the world, and a unit, scale, measure, and calculator. There is an objectively optimal state which we call Utopia. Such can only be achieved by intelligent means through physical and psychological force. The ideal or perfection isn’t always obtainable, thus one may settle with what is good enough or functional. Of course, since ethics is only generated between more than one agent, objects/products with universal use are most prized. A cohesive group of individuals, i.e. the collective, have more value than a single individual (assuming all are virtuous). This gives objects that can serve the whole more import than objects that can only serve a part. Obviously, every individual can’t use everything everywhere all the time, nor is any product always appropriate for every task. Physical products take precedent to psychological ones as unembodied objects, i.e. objects with no interaction with reality, have no use. Personal objects pertain to one’s identity and appear to be valued more than merely pleasant or beautiful items. Vice agents have their own weight, which is the subjective, as some objects have a function that lends itself more towards harm.
